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MEDICARE
Hospital Coverage Under
Medicare
While Medicare appears
to afford generous cover-
age for hospital care,
statutory limitations and
changes in medical prac-
tice often make access to
coverage problematic.
By Edward Dale,
Cheryldiane Feuerman,
and Tina Georgiades
Cheryldiane Feuerman is a Senior
Staff Attorney with the Elder Law
and Legal Assistance to Medicare
Patients Unit of Connecticut Legal
Services, Inc., and has specialized
in Medicare law for over 10 years.
Hospital Coverage
Medicare appears to afford gen-
erous benefits for hospital care.
It will pay for the majority of the
costs of inpatient hospital care'
so long as it is medically neces-
sary for treatment or diagnosis.'
For nonpsychiatric hospitaliza-
tions, beneficiaries are eligible
for up to 90 days of benefits for
each "spell of illness," with 60
additional days per lifetime
(known as "lifetime reserve
days") available to each benefi-
ciary.' For psychiatric hospital-
izations, benefits are limited to
190 days per lifetime.' In prac-
tice, however, beneficiaries may
encounter attempts to deny them
admission to the hospital or to
terminate Medicare coverage
before they are ready to leave the
hospital.
Edward Dale, Director of the
Elder Law and Legal Assistance to
Medicare Patients Unit of
Connecticut Legal Services, Inc.,
since 1986, frequently provides
instruction on Medicare and the
Medicare appeals process for med-
ical and legal professionals.
Medicare beneficiaries admit-
ted for inpatient hospital care
are responsible for a deductible
amount per spell of illness5 and a
coinsurance amount for days 61
through 150.6 The deductible
and coinsurance amounts are
subject to change annually. Most
Medicare beneficiaries maintain
private Medicare supplement
(Medigap) insurance that covers
all or part of the Medicare coin-
surance and deductible amounts.
Certain "luxury" items such as
private rooms, private-duty
nurses, television, and telephone
are not covered by Medicare.
Medicare's definition of a
"spell of illness" significantly
limits coverage. A spell of illness
ends and a new spell of illness
begins 60 days after the patient
is no longer receiving any inpa-
tient hospital services or skilled
Tina Georgiades attends
Quinnipiac Law School and interns
with Connecticut Legal Services,
Inc.
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nursing services in a skilled nurs-
ing facility.7 For example, a
patient who is hospitalized for
90 days, enters a skilled nursing
facility, and is then rehospital-
ized would not be entitled to any
additional hospital coverage. A
different result would occur if
the patient was hospitalized for
150 days, discharged for 62
days, and then rehospitalized. In
that case, the first spell of illness
would have ended and a second
spell of illness with a new round
of coverage would be triggered
by the second hospitalization.'
In addition to covering inpa-
tient hospitalization, continuing
coverage under Medicare's hos-
pital benefit is available to
patients who no longer need hos-
pital care but who do require
skilled care in a nursing facility if
there are no beds available in a
Medicare-certified skilled nurs-
ing facility.' This coverage will
end if the beneficiary fails to
accept the first available bed in a
Medicare-certified skilled nurs-
ing facility or when the need for
daily, skilled nursing facility level
of care ceases." A Medicare-cov-
ered hospital stay is also a pre-
requisite for any coverage for a
subsequent nursing facility stay.
Without an inpatient hospital
stay lasting three days, not
counting the day of discharge,
there is no Medicare coverage for
nursing home care."
Coverage Denials and
Terminations
There are several problems
regarding hospital benefits that
may be challenged through the
Medicare appeal process: (1)
"medical necessity" denials-
either the initial denial of
Medicare coverage when the
patient seeks admission (an
admission denial) or the termi-
nation of Medicare coverage
subsequent to a Medicare-
approved admission (a contin-
ued-stay denial); (2) the attempt
to discharge the patient who
needs skilled nursing facility care
in the absence of an appropriate
nursing home placement; and (3)
the attempt to discharge without
proper notice. A significant hur-
dle for most patients is that they
become personally liable for the
costs of care as soon as Medicare
disavows coverage. With very
limited exceptions,' an appeal
can only be filed when the
patient decides to enter the hos-
pital or to continue to stay there
after being notified that
Medicare will not pay for care.
Medical Necessity Cases
Hospital coverage is often
denied based on a judgment that
the patient did not initially
require treatment or diagnostic
services that could only be safely
and effectively rendered in an
inpatient hospital setting. For
example, the hospital or
Medicare may take the position
that the patient could have been
cared for through outpatient ser-
vices or at a skilled nursing facil-
ity, or that a surgical procedure
could have been safely per-
formed at an ambulatory surgi-
cal center.
Even where coverage is ini-
tially granted upon admission,
Medicare coverage will usually
be terminated as soon as, in the
hospital's view, the patient's con-
dition has improved to the
extent that further care, treat-
ment, or diagnostic testing could
be provided in an alternative set-
ting." The major incentive
encouraging quick discharges is
the diagnostic-related group
(DRG) system for hospital reim-
bursement used by Medicare.
The DRG system establishes a
set price that a hospital will be
paid based on the admitting
diagnosis, regardless of the
length of the actual hospital stay.
Once the hospital announces
that coverage is terminated, the
patient is faced with the choice
of leaving or staying and paying
the hospital's private-pay rate. A
recurrent problem is that
patients are terminated from
coverage before they are well
enough to leave the hospital.
For both admission- and con-
tinued-stay-related denials, Medi-
care benefits can be won
through the appeals process if it
can be shown that the services
required by the particular
patient necessitate care, treat-
ment, or diagnostic testing in a
hospital setting.
The courts, in reviewing
Medicare cases involving ques-
tions of medical necessity, have
established two standards. First,
the courts have consistently
ruled that the patient's total con-
dition at the time the hospital-
ization occurred and during the
stay must be considered. Under
these decisions, both actual and
potential needs for care and
diagnostic services that prompt-
ed inpatient care must be taken
into account, not just the care
and services actually provided.
Absent medical certainty that
the patient's condition was sta-
ble, and that there was no signif-
icant risk in denying admission
or discharging the patient, cov-
erage must be afforded. Second,
the courts have ruled that hospi-
tal coverage must be afforded
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whenever a hospital has provid-
ed any of the services listed in
Title 42 of the United States
Code (U.S.C.) Section 1395x(b),"
unless this care was purely cus-
todial in nature or was not med-
ically reasonable and necessary.
Sowell v. Richardson" is the
seminal decision as to the rule
that the patient's total condition
must be considered and that rea-
soned, contemporaneous judg-
ment as to the needs and poten-
tial needs for care must not be
nullified based on the perfect
vision of hindsight.'" The plain-
tiff, a 72-year-old cancer patient
with diabetes and emphysema,
was hospitalized for six days
with shortness of breath,
swelling in one leg, and inability
to walk or care for herself. Care
in the hospital consisted of diag-
nostic testing, oral medications,
and a diabetic diet. The short-
ness of breath that precipitated
the admission did not abate in
the hospital and she was dis-
charged to a nursing facility in
the same condition as when she
was admitted to the hospital.
The court awarded Medicare
coverage, noting that the per-
ceived need for care at the time
of admission determines cover-
age:
The legislation which created
health insurance for the aged is
remedial and therefore to be
construed liberally to effectuate
the congressional purpose. The
purpose of the Act was to
insure that adequate medical
care was available to the elder-
ly throughout this country.
Neither the courts nor the
Secretary should, in the interest
[of] minimizing costs, so inter-
pret the provisions of the Act as
to frustrate its purpose. A sensi-
ble nontechnical approach to
interpretation of this chapter is
necessary in order to give effect
to the purpose of the Act and to
afford equitable treatment to
those seeking its benefits.
The position taken by the
Secretary is not in accord with
these principles. Under his for-
mula for determining whether
the services are covered only
the service actually rendered is
considered. The condition of
the insured and manifest symp-
toms of the illness are in his
view only relevant to the extent
that they determine the treat-
ment administered. Were the
law as contended by the
Secretary, consideration of the
trees is commanded but even a
glimpse of the forest is prohibit-
ed. It was never intended by
Congress that the condition of
the insured, treatment that
might at any time be necessary,
and the pain and discomfort
attending inadequate or unpro-
fessional care or lack of care
not be considered together with
the treatment actually provided
in determining whether extend-
ed care services are justified.
Every aspect of the plaintiff's
physical condition must be con-
sidered in making the determi-
nation. Treatments immediately
required are of course a major
factor. However, even if no
treatment were required the
condition of the insured might
be so unstable or unsatisfacto-
ry, as to require the extended
services contemplated by the
statute."
Other cases have expanded
this rationale. In Studer v.
Weinberger," the court stated:
[T]he [Medicare Appeals]
Council noted only that the
claimant was assisted in moving
and meeting her activities of
daily living and that she was
given oral medications that did
not require hospitalization....
But the Council . . . gave no
consideration to those services
that might have been needed
and for which the claimant's
stay was, for the most part,
required. That is, even though
her stay was "uneventful," her
care was not necessarily custo-
dial. . . . Even if all the services
actually provided were "custo-
dial in nature," a patient could
still be required to remain in
hospital because of potential
complications and that stay
would be covered by the Act.
. . . The undisputed evidence
indicated that the plaintiff
required the availability of the
medical facilities of a hospital."
In Duncan v. Weinberger,20
involving an 81-year-old man
hospitalized for stroke-related
left-side paralysis, the court ruled:
[C]onsideration must be given
to items and services that may
be required by the patient and
... coverage may not be denied
simply by considering only
those treatments and services
actually supplied. . . . It is the
quality of the care and the pos-
sible consequences of the lack
of required services and not
merely the quantity of the care
that is crucial in determining
whether the patient required
the level of care contemplated
by the Act as being covered.2'
A second line of cases estab-
lished that once it is determined
88 Eler's Advisor
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that the care provided was med-
ically reasonable and necessary
and that this care was not custo-
dial in nature, then coverage
should be awarded for hospital
care so long as the care rendered
includes any of the skilled ser-
vices listed in 42 U.S.C. Section
1395x(b). In Kavanagh v.
Bowen,22 the court stated:
[A]bsent a statutory exclusion,
physical therapy constitutes
inpatient hospital services cov-
ered by Medicare. . . . [T]he
Secretary, in ruling that a hospi-
tal patient must be acutely ill in
order to qualify for Medicare
coverage, and that Medicare
will not reimburse the cost of
skilled hospital care that could
have been provided in a less
skilled facility, applied an erro-
neous interpretation of the
Social Security Act. . . . [T]he
proper standard under the Act
is the level of care received and
whether, given the patient's
condition, it was reasonable
and necessary. . . . [A]s long as
the treatment received was rea-
sonable and necessary, the loca-
tion of the treatment is irrele-
vant to Medicare coverage....
The record indicates that the
rehabilitation services that [the
patient] received were skilled as
that term is defined in the rele-
vant regulation. 42 C.F.R.
S 409.33(c) . . . [and] were also
"inpatient services" as defined
in subparagraph (3) of 42
U.S.C. 5 1395x(b).2 3
Hultzman v. Weinberger2 4
involved hospitalization neces-
sary for diagnostic services and
physical and occupational thera-
py. The court held that medical-
ly necessary, noncustodial ser-
vices trigger Medicare coverage
for hospital care. Section
1395y(a)(1) excludes from cov-
erage only those services that are
not reasonable and necessary to
the treatment or diagnosis of a
patient's ailments. It does not
speak at all to the question of
whether it is medically necessary
to provide such services on an
inpatient or outpatient basis or
in a hospital rather than an
extended care facility.25
In Holladay v. Weinberger,26
the court reversed the decision of
the Secretary denying Medicare
coverage to the plaintiff, who
had been treated in a hospital for
osteoarthritis, acute hypo-
chromic anemia, chronic bron-
chitis, and bronchial asthma.
The court concluded that
[Section] 1395y(a) does not
draw any distinction based on
the type of facility at which
treatment may be provided.
The section only excludes from
Medicare coverage those inpa-
tient hospital services not rea-
sonable or necessary to treat-
ment or diagnosis of the
claimant's condition. If inpa-
tient hospital services are med-
ically necessary and not custo-
dial in character, nothing in the
plain language of 1395y(a)
would forbid payment altogeth-
er simply because those services
might have been rendered in an
extended care facility. . . .
Congress could not have
intended to deny payment to
qualified individuals for essen-
tial medical treatment solely
because, without fault of the
claimant, that treatment was
rendered at an acute hospital
rather than an extended care
facility."
Denials While Awaiting
Nursing Facility Placement
Hospital coverage may be
improperly denied to the patient
who should be transferred to a
skilled nursing facility (SNF). As
noted above, Medicare law pro-
vides for continued hospital care
if the patient requires SNF care
and no appropriate SNF facility
bed is available.28 Because of the
financial pressure to discharge
patients, this requirement is often
ignored by hospital staff and the
Medicare system. Given the diffi-
culties patients may face in secur-
ing an SNF bed following hospi-
talization, this is an area where
appeals are often appropriate.
Financial difficulties, including
problems relating to securing eli-
gibility for Medicaid (Title 19),
are not valid reasons for denying
Medicare coverage. Similarly,
there is no legal basis to deny
extended hospital coverage when
the patient is denied SNF place-
ment due to the illegal or
improper actions of an SNF or if
a bed is not made available to the
incompetent individual because
the SNF requires written autho-
rization of a conservator and no
conservator has been appointed.
The sole issue is whether place-
ment in an appropriate
Medicare-certified SNF was
available to the patient. The pri-
mary burden of locating an SNF
bed is placed on the discharge
planner." Patients and their
families need only cooperate
with the efforts of the hospital
discharge planning staff to
secure an SNF bed in a facility
that can provide the requisite
level of care and that is reason-
ably close to the patient's place
of residence or other family
members.
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While the statute creating
extended coverage for those
awaiting SNF placement permits
the Secretary to establish criteria
for determining when SNF "care
services are not otherwise avail-
able to the individual," the
Secretary's regulations contain
very little guidance. Only Title
42 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Section 412.80,
contains any narrowing of the
"availability" standard. It limits
the scope of review to a determi-
nation as to whether "a SNF bed
is not available in the area." The
applicable "area" is not other-
wise specified by the regulations.
The court decisions that have
spoken to this issue have fol-
lowed this standard.3 0 In Hurley
v. Bowen,"1 the court of appeals
determined that there are only
two questions that need to be
considered: Did the patient
require at least an SNF level of
care? If so, was the search for an
SNF bed unsuccessful? The
court held "that because there is
no evidence that a SNF bed was
available to Hurley, there is no
basis for the secretary to deny
payment to him."" Based on this
decision, a denial of benefits
would only be justified where
there is specific evidence that an
SNF bed was available to the
patient in question."
In Monmouth Medical
Center v. Harris,34 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the reason for the
lack of availability of an SNF
bed, such as a shortage of beds,
and admission denials relating to
the award of Medicaid coverage
were not relevant in determining
whether to grant or deny cover-
age. As indicated in Monmouth,
Congress and the Secretary have
assigned responsibility for seek-
ing and securing an SNF bed to
the medical personnel involved:
the hospital discharge planning
staff" and the patient's attending
doctor. 6
Failure to Provide Notice of
Noncoverage
Medicare appeals should also be
pursued when the hospital has
failed to provide proper notice
of denial or termination of
Medicare coverage. The pre-
sumption is that all inpatient
hospital care is Medicare-cov-
ered unless the patient receives
written notice to the contrary.
The hospital's utilization review
committee makes the initial deci-
sion whether to grant, deny, or
terminate Medicare coverage. It
is required to issue a written
notice of noncoverage to the
patient, or the patient's represen-
tative, which details the basis for
the noncoverage, explains that
the patient will be financially
liable for continued hospital
care, and describes the patient's
appeal rights." The patient may
not be charged for the care
absent receipt of advanced writ-
ten notice of the denial or dis-
continuation of Medicare cover-
age, including notice of the right
to appeal."
Medicare Appeals in
Hospital Cases
Hospital appeals are initially
processed by a Peer Review
Organization (PRO), an organi-
zation that contracts with the
Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration to review quality-of-care
issues relating to hospitals and
to issue determinations in the
first two levels of the Medicare
appeal process." Appeals of the
initial notification of noncover-
age by the hospital are appealed
to the PRO by a request for
review.
Unlike other areas of
Medicare law, it is possible to
obtain an expedited review of
the initial coverage denial, limit-
ed to cases involving the termi-
nation of Medicare coverage for
hospital stays that were initially
approved for coverage. Benefi-
ciaries are entitled to two days'
advance written notice from the
hospital before Medicare cover-
age is terminated. If an appeal is
initiated during that brief peri-
od, the patient cannot be
charged for the cost of care until
a decision is issued by the PRO.40
Since hospitals may expect
patients to leave when they are
orally advised that coverage is
terminated or that they will be
discharged, requesting written
notice and requesting review
promptly may yield several extra
days of hospital care at no cost
to the patient.
In all hospital cases, appeals
from the PRO review decision
can be taken. Subsequent
appeals include a request for
reconsideration through the
PRO, a hearing before a Social
Security Administration admin-
istrative law judge, an appeal to
the Medicare Appeals Council,
and finally an appeal to the fed-
eral courts. The appeal process
for inpatient hospital appeals is
set forth in Title 42 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.),
Part 473, though this should
also be read in conjunction with
the regulations governing Medi-
care appeals generally: 42 C.F.R.
section 405.701, et seq., and 20
C.F.R. Part 404. Appeals to an
administrative law judge-level
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require at least $200 in contro-
versy." Appeals to the federal
courts are authorized when
$2,000 or more is in dispute.
There is a somewhat differ-
ent appeals process if the patient
is enrolled in a Medicare man-
aged care organization under
Medicare Part C. See 42 C.ER.
Part 422. We will discuss
Medicare managed care and
appeals in future columns.
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